Dealing with misbehaving controllers in SDN networks by Zhang, Tianzhu et al.
Politecnico di Torino
Porto Institutional Repository
[Proceeding] Dealing with misbehaving controllers in SDN networks
Original Citation:
Zhang, Tianzhu; Bianco, Andrea; Giaccone, Paolo; Nezhad Payandehdari, Aliakbar Dealing with
misbehaving controllers in SDN networks. In: Globecom, Singapore.
(In Press)
Availability:
This version is available at : http://porto.polito.it/2678306/ since: August 2017
Publisher:
IEEE
Terms of use:
This article is made available under terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Article
("Public - All rights reserved") , as described at http://porto.polito.it/terms_and_conditions.
html
Porto, the institutional repository of the Politecnico di Torino, is provided by the University Library
and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to all the world. Please share with us how
this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Publisher copyright claim:
c© 20xx IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained
for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for
advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to
servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works
(Article begins on next page)
Dealing with misbehaving controllers
in SDN networks
Tianzhu Zhang, Andrea Bianco, Paolo Giaccone, Aliakbar Payandehdari Nezhad
Dept. Electronics and Telecommunications, Politecnico di Torino, Italy
Abstract—The logical centralized approach in the control of
SDN networks allows an unprecedented level of programmability
in the network, but also implies the vulnerability in the case
of misbehavior of the controller, due for example to software
bugs, hardware problems or hacker attacks. In our work we
propose to exploit the diversity offered by multiple controllers to
manage the network switches and detect misbehaviors whenever
one controller issues different OpenFlow instructions for the data
plane with respect to the others. We design a behavioral checker,
denoted as BeCheck, that acts as a transparent relay in the
interaction between the network switches and the controllers. We
propose and investigate different policies to relay the messages
and to detect the controller misbehavior. We implement and
validate our approach in a simple testbed, showing the possible
tradeoff between detection reliability and controller reactivity
perceived at the switches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike traditional IP networks, software-defined network-
ing (SDN) decouples the network control logic and the for-
warding functions. SDN controllers act as the “brain” of the
network by making routing decisions and configuring the
underlying simple forwarding devices in a logically centralized
fashion. This refinement greatly simplifies network configura-
tion and programmability.
However, just like any complex systems, SDN controllers
are susceptible to misbehaviors, exacerbated by the centralized
approach. Software bugs (e.g., persistent loops, synchroniza-
tion failure, inconsistent state, response omission etc.) have
been discovered in many popular SDN controllers. According
to [1], the load balancer of Floodlight [2] may fail to dis-
tribute flows consistently and the POX [3] forwarding modules
can delete rules installed by other modules. Furthermore,
experiments in [4] detected totally 11 bugs on merely 3
applications of NOX [5]. Even the most practically relevant
open source SDN controllers, namely OpenDaylight (ODL) [6]
and ONOS [7], are not immune to bugs. According to [8],
ODL can face flow deletion and instantiation failure bugs
while link detection inconsistency and flow rules pending
bugs are spotted in ONOS. These bugs can give high risk
to misbehaving controllers. To make things worse, various
security attacks to the control plane increases the possibility
of misbehaving controllers. According to [9], SDN controllers
including POX, Maestro [10], OpenDaylight and Floodlight
are all susceptible to a diversity of security attacks on net-
work topology and data forwarding. In addition, malicious
network administrators can also misconfigure SDN controllers
to sabotage the network [11]. Most of the previous works
improve the reliability and security of SDN control plane either
by verifying the controllers’ behaviors through complicated
analysis such as model checking, or by advocating secure and
dependable design of SDN controllers. Few of them provides
solutions for real-time detection of misbehaving controllers.
In this paper, we present a behavioral checker, denoted as
BeCheck, which is a module that relay the OpenFlow (OF)
traffic between the controllers and the network switches, and
detects misbehaving controllers in real-time, by comparing
the instructions received by the controllers, which operate in
locksteps. BeCheck resides transparently between the SDN
controllers and the data plane, and neither the controllers nor
the forwarding devices need to be modified for its presence.
We propose a misbehavior detection policy, combined with
different forwarding policies, and investigate experimentally
the possible tradeoffs between the detection reliability and
the reactivity of the application as perceived by the network
switches.
The paper is organized as follows. Sec. II discusses the
previous work. Sec. III introduces the architecture of the
proposed solution and describes different detection policies.
Sec. IV describes the implementation of the prototype and
the testbed adopted for the experimental validation. The ex-
perimental results highlight the different tradeoffs between
detection reliability and the controller reactivity as perceived
by the network switches. Finally, in Sec. V we draw our
conclusions.
II. RELATED WORKS
Many recent works [1], [4], [12]–[15] focused on checking
software bugs and verifying the correctness of SDN control
plane. In particular, [12] proposed a system that deductively
verifies if an SDN program is correct on all feasible network
topologies. Similarly, [1] implemented a dynamic analyzer
to identify software bugs and prevent a network from con-
current violations. The work [14] developed a distributed
model checker to verify some security properties related to
the network state. In [15] a troubleshooting technique was
implemented that can automatically detect the minimal se-
quence of random inputs responsible for bugs in the SDN
control plane. The work in [4] presented a model checking
technique with symbolic execution to test the applications
running on top of SDN controllers. On the other hand, the
studies [11], [16] focused on the security aspects of SDN.
In particular, [16] analyzed the threats related to the SDN
paradigm and advocated the design of secure and dependable
SDN controllers. Finally, [11] presented a first prototype of
secure SDN controller designed to deal with malicious SDN
administrators. However, all the above works adopted complex
analysis processes, such as model checking, which are very
time-consuming and difficult to run in real-time. Unlike them,
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Fig. 1: The architecture of BeCheck with 𝐶 = 3 controllers
our work detects misbehaving controllers in real-time by com-
paring the behavior of independent controllers, in a transparent
way for both the controllers and the network switches.
More similar to our work, [13] proposed to check some
network-wide invariants in real time (e.g. loop free routing)
by deploying a software layer between the control and data
plane and dynamically inspecting each flow installation rules.
It was based on a single controller, whereas BeCheck operates
with multiple controllers. The advantage of our approach is that
BeCheck runs completely oblivious of the network application.
Finally, [8] aims at validating the behaviors of distributed SDN
controllers. Similar to us, a consensus process is employed
to determine the correct actions and detect misbehaving con-
trollers. However, the detection is based on replicating the
network events on the other controllers within the cluster,
thus requires some modification of the internal management
of the cluster. Instead, BeCheck is completely transparent
with respect to the controllers, which do not require any
modification.
III. ARCHITECTURE OF OUR BEHAVIORAL CHECKER
Fig. 1 shows the general architecture of our behavioral
checker, which exploits the diversity offered by multiple
controllers running in lockstep the same network application.
Let 𝐶 be the number of controllers, with 𝐶 ≥ 2. All 𝐶
controllers operate on the same network, and each controller
is responsible for managing all the switches, i.e. acting as
master for OpenFlow (OF) switches. The controllers run the
same network application; thus, if they all behave correctly,
they will show the same sequence of messages sent to the
switches. Thus, misbehaviors can be detected by comparing the
messages received by the controllers and check if inconsistent
messages are sent to the switches. Our behavioral checking
module, denoted as BeCheck, is responsible to digest the
OF instructions arriving from the controllers, check their
consistency and replicate a copy of the instructions to the
destined switch. At the same time, BeCheck replicates all the
network events to all the controllers, to ensure that the network
applications proceed in lockstep with coherent states. BeCheck
is connected to the switches as it was their master controller,
but actually its role is just to detect misbehaviors and relay the
messages in both directions between switches and controllers.
Thus, BeCheck does not substitute the controller and does
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Fig. 2: Example of BeCheck behavior with 𝐶 = 3 controllers
not take any decision for the data plane, being completely
oblivious of the specific network application running on the
controllers.
It is worth to highlight that our approach is different from
a cluster of distributed controllers, where each controller acts
as master only for a subset of switches. Distributed controllers
indeed are aimed at improving reliability and scalability of
the SDN control plane. Instead, in our case we exploit the
diversity provided by multiple controllers, in order to detect
misbehaviors. It would be also possible to extend our approach
to cluster of controllers, i.e. each controller in Fig. 1 might be
a different cluster of distributed controllers, but we have left
this extension for future work.
BeCheck acts as a relay for the OF messages between
the controllers and the switches. Not all the OF messages
are actually processed by BeCheck, since some of them are
not meaningful to detect misbehaviors in the data plane.
In OF standard [17], three kinds of messages are defined:
(i) controller-to-switch messages, which are initiated by the
controller and allow to manage the switches; (ii) asynchronous
messages, which are initiated by the switch and allow to update
the controller about some local events (e.g. changes in the
switch state); (iii) symmetric messages, which are initiated by
either the switch or the controller and sent without solicita-
tion. In our case, we consider just the main OF messages
dictating the forwarding behavior of the data plane in the
network, i.e. pkt-in (which is an asynchronous message),
flow-mod (which is a controller-to-switch message) and
pkt-out (which is a controller-to-switch message). All the
other kinds of messages are instead transparently forwarded
by BeCheck.
As example of BeCheck behavior, consider the scenario
of a reactive forwarding network application. Assume now
that a switch receives a packet from the network, generates a
pkt-in message and its master controller reacts by sending
to the switch a flow-mod message. As shown in Fig. 2,
the switch sends the pkt-in to BeCheck, which replicates
it to all the three controllers. Now each controller reacts to the
pkt-in independently, and sends a flow-mod message to
BeCheck. If now BeCheck finds out that all the 3 messages
received by the controllers are coherent, then it sends to
the switch one copy of the flow-mod. Otherwise, in the
case of inconsistency, i.e. one controller behaving incorrectly,
BeCheck can react in different ways: e.g., generates an alarm
towards the controllers, or disables the interaction with the
OF message type Datapath-id Switch xid Controllers xid
pkt-out ...:0A 1001 {101, 201, 301}
flow-mod ...:FB 1002 {102, 202, 302}
TABLE I: Example of XID table for 3 controllers
misbehaving controller. The details on how to manage misbe-
having controllers are outside the scope of the current paper.
There are three critical challenges about implementing
BeCheck. First, to guarantee the communication between
BeCheck and all the controllers, the transaction id (“xid”)
for each single controller must be managed correctly. Since
BeCheck module interacts with multiple controllers which
may react to a network event using different xids, OF reply
messages with wrong xids from the network can result in
connection refusal by the controllers. BeCheck implements a
scheme to map the xids used to interact with the controller
and the xids to interact with the switches. Second, to detect
misbehaving controllers, the action/s associated with each
OF controller-to-switch message (i.e. pkt-out, flow-mod)
must be recorded and the messages are checked in terms of co-
herence between the different controllers. BeCheck records the
messages from the controllers throughout a Pending Message
(PM) table. Third, the policy according to which the behavior
check is preformed as well as the timing to send the required
OF messages to the switches have different impacts on the
detection reliability and on the reactivity of BeCheck. BeCheck
implements one of the three detection policies described in
Sec. III-C.
The software architecture of BeCheck, as shown in Fig 1,
mainly consists of two components: controller handler and
network handler. The controller handler manages the message
exchange with the controllers whereas the network handler
manages the message exchange with the network switches.
The XID table is shared between the two components and it
implements a one-to-many table mapping for the xids used for
the network switches and for the controllers. The PM table
buffers the instructions of the OF messages received from the
controllers and it is updated by the controller handler. The
Checker submodule is in charge of running the policy to verify
the behavioral consistency among the messages received by the
controllers and to detect possible misbehaviors.
A. Network handler
The network handler plays the role of forwarding OF
messages between the controller handler and the network.
Whenever an OF message is received from the network, the
network handler adds the corresponding xid field in the XID
table and replicates the message to all the controllers, storing
the corresponding values of xids used for the interaction with
the controllers. The XID mapping is required since multiple
controllers may send OF messages with different xids to react
the same event, and OF reply messages with unexpected xids
are discarded by the controllers.
The XID table consists of 4 fields, mainly based on the 8-
byte header of OF. The first two fields are aimed at identifying
the message, while the last two store the xids mapping. The
message is identified through the OF 1-byte “message type”
and the corresponding switch is identified through the 8 byte
OF message type Datapath-id Action Controller bitmask 𝐵
pkt-out ...:0A output 1 100
flow-mod ...:FB output 3 110
TABLE II: Example of PM table for 3 controllers
“datapath-id” (based on the switch MAC address). Finally, the
xid is detected by the 4-byte xid present in the OF header of the
messages exchanged with the network and with the controllers.
An example of XID table is shown in Table I.
B. Controller handler and detection policy
The controller handler is the central part of BeCheck.
It maintains the connections with the SDN controllers and
forwards OF messages between the controllers and the network
handler. It also collects and inspects the messages from the
controllers’ side, so as to detect possible misbehaviors. All
the OF messages, except flow-mod and pkt-out, are sent
directly to the switches in a seamless fashion.
If all the controllers behave identically, BeCheck expects
exactly the same OF message received from all the three
controllers in some random order. A message is considered
“pending” if it has been only confirmed by a subset of
controllers. The handler operates on the Pending Message
(PM) table, based on the OF messages (either pkt-out or
flow-mod) received from the controller.
The detection policy is based on the full consensus on the
messages received by the controllers and works as follows.
Only when a message is confirmed by all the controllers,
then it is considered correct and removed from the PM table.
Otherwise, after a fixed timeout, an entry is removed and
a misbehavior event is generated, since the corresponding
command has not been confirmed by all the controllers.
The PM table contains a message identifier identical to the
one in XID table, based on the message type and the datapath-
id. Now the particular action associated to such message is
stored in the table and a controller bitmask 𝐵 = [𝑏𝑖]𝐶𝑖=1 is
updated to keep track of the controllers that sent the message;
the 𝑖th bit is defined as:
𝑏𝑖 =
{
1 if the message was received from controller 𝑖
0 else
By construction,
∑𝐶
𝑖=1 𝑏𝑖 gives the number of controllers from
which the message from received. Whenever
∑𝐶
𝑖=1 𝑏𝑖 = 𝐶 (i.e.
the same message has been received from all the 𝐶 controller),
then the corresponding entry is removed from the PM table.
A sample PM is shown in Table II, which refers to the
two messages of Table I. According to it, the pkt-out
message has been already confirmed by controller 1, whereas
the flow-mod message by controllers 1 and 2.
C. Forwarding policy
The Checker submodule in Fig. 1 reacts on changes in the
PM table and triggers two kinds of events: (i) the transmission
to the switch of an OF message, (ii) the misbehavior detection.
We define reaction time as the latency experienced by the
controllers to react to a new event in the network (e.g. pkt-in
due to a new flow) as perceived by the network switches. E.g.,
in the toy example of a reactive forwarding application, the
reaction time is the interval of time between the generation
of the pkt-in for a new flow and the reception of the
flow-mod/pkt-out at the switch, generated by BeCheck.
We propose three different forwarding policies, each of them
with a distinct trade-off between detection reliability and
reactivity:
∙ Consensus policy (CO) sends the OF message to the
switch only when the message has been received by
all the controllers, i.e. only when
∑𝐶
𝑖=1 𝑏𝑖 = 𝐶. This
approach introduces the largest reaction time, since it
depends on the slowest controller, but it is the most
reliable policy since it is able to detect immediately
misbehavior of just 1 controller and sends to the
switches only fully correct messages. In the case of
a misbehavior, BeCheck will not relay the messages
from the controllers to the switches, since they are
unconfirmed by all the controllers, and this results into
a network outage.
∙ First Response policy (FR) sends the OF message to
the switch just after the first message has been received
by any controller, i.e. as soon as
∑𝐶
𝑖=1 𝑏𝑖 = 1. In
the case of a misbehavior, BeCheck will keep relay
the messages until the timeout of the corresponding
entries in the PM table expires and the detection
occurs. This approach introduces the smallest reac-
tion time, due to the fastest controller, but it is the
least reliable policy since incorrect messages may be
sent to the switches (e.g. when the fastest controller
is misbehaving) and the misbehavior detection takes
longer.
∙ Majority policy (MA) sends the OF message to the
switch just when the message has been received by the
majority of the controllers, i.e. when ∑𝐶𝑖=1 𝑏𝑖 > 𝐶/2.
The behavior of this approach is intermediate in terms
of reaction time and reliability with respect to CO and
FR policies.
The performance of these three policies are evaluated in
the following section.
IV. VALIDATION AND EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of BeCheck and compare the
different forwarding policies running in the Checker submod-
ule. For easy reference, we introduce the following notation to
identify the variants of our approach: “BeCheck-X(𝐶)” where
X is either CO, FS or MA depending on the forwarding policy,
and 𝐶 is the number of controllers.
We implement BeCheck module using OpenFlowJ [18] and
NIO.2 libraries [19]; the final source code is around 1500 lines.
The experiments are performed in the scenario shown in Fig. 3,
based on 𝐶 controllers and 𝑁 switches in the network. We run
BeCheck instance directly in a server, together with the con-
troller instances and the network, emulated with Mininet [20].
The switches communicates with BeCheck through port 6633,
thus BeCheck appears as a classic master controller. BeCheck,
in turn, is connected to each controller through their predefined
port 6633.
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Fig. 3: Experimental setup
         	 
   
            
  ﬀ ﬁ ﬂ ﬃ ! " # $ % & '
( ) * + , - . / 0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 : ; < = > ? @ A
B C D E F G H I J K L M N
Fig. 4: Average size of the PM table
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Fig. 5: Response time obtained with ping command
We evaluate the time-average occupancy of the size of the
PM table, since its small size is crucial for the scalability
of the proposed approach, in particular due to misbehaving
controllers. We do not report the size of the XID table since
its occupancy (never larger than PM table) is not affected by
possible misbehaving controllers.
We perform our tests with 𝐶 independent instances
of POX controller [3], each of them running the default
l3-learning application for reactive forwarding. We show
the results for 𝐶 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Note that for 𝐶 = 1 the
forwarding policy does not have any effect, since acts just as
a message relay, and this case is used as term of comparison
for the evaluation of the computation overhead of the bare
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Fig. 6: Average size of the PM table in the case of one
misbehaving controller
BeCheck application (e.g. due to the socket management for
the transmission and reception of OF messages). In all our
experiments, the network topology is linear, connecting 𝑁
switches, with 𝑁 ∈ {1, . . . , 10}.
We also evaluate the reactivity perceived by the switches by
running the ping -c 1 command at the terminal connected
at the first switch, generating one single ICMP packet towards
the 𝑁 th switch, and recording the corresponding Round Trip
Time (RTT) for the first ICMP request/reply exchange in the
switch.
Fig. 4 shows the table size for 𝐶 ∈ {3, 4} and 𝑁 ∈
{2, 3, 4, 5}, for different forwarding policies. Consensus (CO)
policy always presents the minimal average number of entries,
whereas First Response (FR) policy shows the largest number
of entries. The reason can be easily understood assuming
that one controller is much slower than the others to process
the pkt-in messages received by the network, relayed by
BeCheck. Indeed, for CO only when all the OF flow-mod
messages are received by BeCheck for a target switch, then
the message is sent to the switch, which forwards the ICMP
packet one hop further along the path. Thanks to the deletion
policy in PM table, the corresponding entry is deleted and thus
the maximum number of entries is one independently from the
number of controllers. On the contrary, FR policy sends the
flow-mod to the destined switch as soon as it receives the
message from the fastest controller, without waiting for the
slowest controller. Thus each switch can forward the ICMP
packet to the next switch in the path, without waiting for the
flow-mod generated by the slow controller. But this implies
that a large number of entries will be present in the table,
which will be deleted only when the slowest controller sends
the flow-mod message. Majority (MA) policy instead, by
construction, behaves in an intermediate way with respect to
CO and FS.
Our intuitive explanation is corroborated by observing the
reaction time perceived at the network switches, as shown in
Fig. 5. FR achieves always the best reactivity (i.e. the smallest
RTT), CO the worst, whereas MA is in the middle of the two.
The graph shows also that the RTT increases with respect to the
network size, due to the larger number of hops in the network.
We now consider the scenario in which a controller is
misbehaving. We modify the l3-learning application in
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Fig. 7: Performance evaluated with Cbench tool
one controller to send always the ICMP packet towards an
unused port of the switch. Fig. 6 shows the occupancy of the
PM table. The number of entries for CO is now bounded by
two, independently from the number of switches, since CO
receives a coherent OF message from 𝑁 -1 controllers and
another one from the misbehaving controller. CO detects at
once the inconsistency. The other two policies are also able
to detect the misbehavior but, differently from CO, allow the
network application run for the non-misbehaving controllers.
The main difference between FR and MA is that MA assures
always a correct behavior (since the majority of the controllers
are behaving correctly in our scenario), whereas FR generates
wrong instructions on the data plane whenever the misbehaving
controller is the fastest. In all these cases, the occupancy of
PM tables grows proportionally to 2𝑁 , since around 2 pending
messages are stored for each switch.
To evaluate the actual overhead due to BeCheck, we keep
the same configuration as in Fig. 3 with all the controller
behaving correctly, but we use Cbench to emulate the network
with 𝑁 switches instead of Mininet. Cbench is not able to
emulate a real network topology, but just a set of 𝑁 switches
flooding the controller with pkt-in messages. We run now
l2-learning application on POX controller. We record the
“throughput” of BeCheck in terms of maximum number of
responses per second, as measured by Cbench. The results
are obtained by averaging the results for 100 tests, each of
them lasting for 1 sec. The results of the tests are shown in
Fig. 7. As expected, the throughput decreases with increasing
number of switches, since in Cbench the switches generate
pkt-in messages simultaneously. As term of comparison, we
report also the scenario, denoted as “No BeCheck”, in which
BeCheck is not present between the network and the single
controller. Thus, from Fig. 7 it is clear that the reduction of
throughput for larger networks is due to the POX controller.
Furthermore, BeCheck(1) (i.e. with just one controller) shows
a minimum degradation in terms of performance, due to the
basic operation of relaying the messages between the controller
and the switches. Instead, when the forwarding policies are
effective, the performance degrades almost proportionally with
respect to the number of controllers. This result is quite
expected since each POX controller is able to answer to the
flooding requests of Cbench without almost any processing,
and thus the main bottleneck becomes the BeCheck module,
on which the processing of multiple controllers converges.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We propose a behavioral checker, denoted as BeCheck, to
detect in real-time possible misbehaviors of SDN controllers.
We assume that multiple, independent controllers are running
the same network application, and thus their behavior must
be coherent. BeCheck is based on a module which relay the
OpenFlow traffic between the controllers and the network
switches, and compares the OpenFlow instructions to detect
possible misbehaviors. We propose a detection policy based
on the full consensus on the messages from the controllers.
Combined with the detection policy, we consider the effect of
different forwarding policies, First Response (FR), Majority
(MA) and Consensus (CO), which offer different tradeoffs
between the detection reliability and the latency introduced by
the BeCheck module. BeCheck runs completely transparent
from the point of view of the network switches and the SDN
controllers, and operates obviously from the specific network
application running on the SDN controllers.
We implement BeCheck as a standalone module and in-
vestigated its performance for the specific case of a basic
reactive forwarding application running in multiple instances
of POX controller. We show the possible tradeoff between the
detection reliability and the controller reactivity as perceived
by the switches, for the different detection policies. We also
evaluate the throughput degradation due to BeCheck.
Our results, even if preliminary, are promising, and can
be extended to consider applications, coherent in terms of
behavior, running on completely different controllers, in order
to detect misbehaviors in a more reliable way. We leave this
extension for future work.
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